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they will be treated as fraudulent, since creditors can only recoup the amount
of the cash surrender value created by the premium.36
There can be little doubt that both the Silansky and New York positions
lack the merits of the approach adopted in the Doethiaff and Ross cases. While
the New York rule gives inadequate protection to the insured's dependents, the
Silansky approach gives too much latitude to the insured inclined to predatory
practice. The Ross-Doethlaff line at least has attempted to balance the interests
of creditors with the public policy favoring dependents. Of course, the ideal
solution would be an exemption statute clearly limiting the amount of pre-
miums which could be paid annually without danger of being labelled fraudu-
lent. Such statutes fortunately are becoming more frequent.37 They not only
provide certainty but properly place delicate decisions of public policy in the
hands of the legislatures.
(. as if the contrary opinion would blow up Lombard-street."
Holt, C. J., in Ward v. Evans*
The following comments explore the relation between legal doctrine and com-
mercial practice by examining two specific problems in the field of insurance
law. In each case, a well settled rule of law continues to be challenged by force-
ful dissents. And in each case, a marked divergence between reasonable lay
expectations and the law is evident. In Lord Mansfield's time, it was considered
sensible and practical for the courts themselves to investigate the understand-
ings of the commercial world. Probably the proximity of the courts to centers of
commercial activity in London was influential in this respect. But the distance
between the courts and laymen today may be intellectual as well as physical.
The need for law revision has been recognized. Equally necessary is the kind of
empirical investigation here recommended.
FIRE INSURANCE AND CHOICE OF PARTIES: THE
VAGARIES OF "MORAL HAZARD"
May one interested in the property insured against fire, but not a party to the
insurance contract, maintain an action directly against the insurer? It has long
been the general rule to deny recovery on the ground that a fire insurance con-
* 2 Raym. Rep. 928, 930 (1702).
36 In re Goodchild, io F. Supp. 491 (E.D.N.Y., 1935); contrast Doethlaff v. Penn. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 117 F. 2d 582 (C.A. 6th, 1941) where a court, in a jurisdiction known for a
"liberal" construction approach to such premiums, used a different rule than that limiting
creditors' rights to the amount of cash surrender value created by fraudulent transfers. The
Doethlaff court allows the recovery of the amount fraudulently transferred, as opposed to the
stricter increment theory.
37 An exemption statute clearly indicating how much money may be devoted to the pay-
ment of premiums after insolvency spares the courts the task of moderating the conflict be-
tween creditors and dependents. For a compilation of these statutes, see Illinois Ins. Code
Ann. 461 (11. State Bar Ass'n, 1939).
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tract is a "personal contract of indemnity."' Fire insurance is predicated on the
existence of an insurable interest' and indemnifies its holder only to the extent
of the loss of that interest. Moreover, in fire insurance cases the courts per-
sistently emphasize the notion that the insurer exercises his choice of parties
with view to their character and moral integrity.3
The logical application of these notions is illustrated by two early English
cases. In Rayner v. Preston4 property subject to an executory land contract was
destroyed before the deed was executed. The contract made no reference to the
vendor's insurance. After the vendor had collected from his insurance com-
pany, the purchaser paid the purchase price and sued the vendor for the insur-
ance proceeds. The court held that the vendee had no right to the insurance
money since the policy indemnified only the interest of the vendor, i.e., it was a
personal contract of indemnity between the vendor and the underwriter to
which the purchaser was not a party; and therefore unless there was an assign-
ment,s the right to the proceeds could not run, even in equity, to the purchaser.
x In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 Ati. 86 (1936); Brownell v. Board of Education,
239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925); Draper v. Del. State Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 28
Del. 143, 91 AUl. 206 (1914); Traders' Ins. Co. v. Newman, 120 Ind. 554, 22 N.E. 428 (1889).
'An all-inclusive d6finition of what constitutes an insurable interest is impossible. But a
useful rule of thumb might be: such relation or connection with a property interest, that pe-
cuniary benefit or advantage will be derived from its preservation, or a corresponding loss will
be suffered by the happening of the event insured against. Sandlin's Adm'x. v. Allen, 262 Ky.
355, 357, 90 S.W. 2d 350, 351 (1936). See also Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co., iii Cal. 409, 414
(1896); Tyler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 12 Wend. (N.Y.) 507 (1834).
' It is true that all contracts are in a sense personal and that all contracting parties con-
sider each other's "character and moral integrity"; but it appears that only in the area of fire
insurance do the courts emphasize the notion so persistently. See, e.g., In re Gorman's Estate,
321 Pa. 292, 295, 184 At]. 86, 87 (1936); Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146
N.E. 639 (1925).
For purposes of the present analysis, contracts generally may be classified into three
categories: (i) the ordinary business contracts, where the parties bargain for a benefit to be
reaped by each within the normal risk of the commercial world (unilateral contracts should
fall within this category); (2) contracts which require payment of a sum to a party upon the
happening of a particular event, including (a) those generally considered wagers (gambling in
the usual sense of the word) and (b) those typified by life insurance where a person having an
insurable interest in his or another's life pays a premium so that upon death a sum of money
becomes payable; (3) contracts of indemnity, like fire insurance.'
Fire insurance, unlike a wagering contract, is based on the existence of an insurable inter-
est, as is life insurance. The latter is distinguishable as involving payment to one who may
have suffered no loss, while fire insurance involves the deterrent of indemnity, i.e., payment
to the insured only in case of loss and to the extent of loss. It has been sigggested that, "[prac-
tically, it is not a perfect deterrent, since a few insured persons will burn their own property
in the hope of exaggerating the extent of their losses or of converting non-salable property into
cash." Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 22, at 89 (1935).
4 18 Ch. D. i (i88i).
s It has always been held that fire insurance policies are not assignable before loss. (An
assignment after loss is governed by the general rules of assignment.) The theory is that such
an assignment may increase the "moral hazard" to be borne by the insurer and thus deny his
right to select the parties with whom he will contract. The standard fire policies now in use con-
tain provisions that the policy shall be void if it is assigned before loss, without the written
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The dissenting opinion contended that according to principles of "equity"
the insurance ran with the land and that the vendor was a constructive trustee of
the proceeds for the benefit of the purchaser. In Castellian v. Preston,6 a sequel
to Rayner v. Preston, the insurer was permitted to recover the proceeds, since
the vendor, having been paid the purchase price in full, had suffered no loss.
Although the notion of a fire insurance contract as a personal contract of
indemnity has broken down in the life tenant-remainderman and the vendor-
purchaser cases, it has been preserved in the mortgage cases. The separate in-
terests of a mortgagor and mortgagee are each insurable and neither has a right
to the money payable on the other's policy7 Even where a mortgagor covenants
to keep property insured for the benefit, protection, or better security of the
mortgagee, and breaks the agreement by taking out insurance in his own name
without assigning it or making it payable to the mortgagee, the agreement to
insure has been held to create only an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds
in favor of the mortgagee. 8 And, subjecting insurance funds to the equitable lien
consent of the insurer. (This provision may be dispensed with by a rider or similar negating
clause.) The courts have been strict in requiring the insurer's consent. Patterson, Essentials
of Insurance Law § 49, at i83-85 (1935). For a limited adherence to a contrary doctrine, see
Central Union Bank v. N.Y. Underwriters' Ins. Co., 52 F. 2d 823 (C.A. 5 th, 1931) and Whiting
v. Burkhardt, 178 Mass. 535, 6o N.E. i (igoi) which recognize the validity of an assignment
of a mortgagee's rights under the mortgage (loss payable) clause, accompanied by an assign-
ment of the mortgage, even though the insurer's consent to the assignment was not obtained.
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 49, at 184 (1935).
6 11 Q.B.D. 38o (1883).
7 Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Young, io4 Lid. App. 139, 1o N.E. 2d 421 (i937); Kozlowski
v. Pavonia Fire Ins. Co., 116 N.J.L. 194, 183 At. 154 (1936); Brant v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co.,
179 S.C. 55, 183 S.E. 587 (i935); Baughman v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., x63 Minn. 300, 204
N.W. 321 (1925); Plum Trees Lime Co. v. Keeler, 92 Conn. i, ioi Atl.509 (1917).
This is also true for all the other property relationships: vendor-purdaser, e.g., Milhous v.
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., i61 S.C. 96, i59 S.E. 506 (1931); Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44,
204 N.W. 235 (1925); Mahan v. Home Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S.W. 593 (1920); life
tenant-remainderinan, cases cited note ii infra; lessor-lessee, e.g., Hale v. Simmons, 2oo Ark.
556, 139 S.W. 2d 696 (1940); Smith v. Royale Ins. Co., iii F. 2d 667 (C.A. 9th, i94o); condi-
tionalseller-conditional buyer, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, I7 P. 2d
626 (1932); In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (E.D. Wis., 1913); Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assur.
Co., 118 Ill. 396, 9 N.E. 274 (1886). For a cross-section of cases see Insurance-Right to
Proceeds, 9 2 A.L.R. 559 (i934)-
8 E.g., Wheeler v. Factors & T. Ins. Co., ioi U.S. 439 (i88o); Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige
(N.Y.) 437 (1840); Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634
(i918). The equity exists even though the contract provides that in case of the mortgagor's
failing to procure and assign such insurance, the mortgagee may procure it at the mortgagor's
expense. Nichols v. Baxter, 5 R.I. 491 (i858); Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 102
Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634 (1918).
These results are also true in the case of a conditional sales contract where the buyer cove-
nants to insure for the benefit of the conditional seller. E.g., Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber
Co., 171 Wash. 55, 17 P. 2d 626 (1932); In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (E.D. Wis., 1913); Grange
Mill Co. v. Western Assur. Co., x18 Ill. 396, 9 N.E. 274 (1886). For a cross-section of cases
see Insurance--Right to Proceeds, 92 A.L.R. 559 (i934).
The equitable lien is said to arise solely from the unperformed contract to protect; the
theory being that since equity regards as done that which ought to have been done, if the
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operates somewhat fortuitously,9 for the mortgagor may collect the proceeds
and abscond before the lien is created; or he may refuse to take the steps neces-
sary to enforce his insurance claim, upon which the mortgagee's lien depends., °
A life tenant and remainderman also have separately insurable interests,"
and unless there exists a fiduciary relationship- or an agreement as to who shall
procure insurance, neither one may collect on an insurance policy taken out
by the other."S However, the life tenant may generally insure up to the full value
of the fee, and upon destruction of the property, collect the whole amount of
the proceeds.'4 Some courts though have held that a life tenant may insure only
mortgagor having so covenanted, fails to make the insurance payable to the mortgagee, or to
assign the same, the fund arising therefrom becomes subject to a lien. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 40 Idaho 236, 232 Pac. 899 (1925); Houston Canning Co. v.
Virginia Can Co., 211 Ala. 232, 1oo So. 104 (1924); In re Sands Ale Brewing Co., 21 Fed. Cas.
No. 12,307 (N.D. Ill., 1872); For the collected cases see Insurance-Right to Proceeds, 92A.L.R. 559, 561 (1934).
The manner in which this equitable principle operates was made clear in Stebbins v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 623, 634, 197 Pac. 913, 916 (1921) where the court said
that even though the policy of insurance may not have been taken out with a view to comply-
ing with the contract or with a view to further the security of the creditor, the intent could
make no difference since the contract required that the very thing be done that was done.
Northwestern F. & M. Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 238 Ky. 229, 37 S.W. 2d 67 (i93 i).
First Nat'l Bank v. Cappellini, 149 Pa. Super. 14, 26 A. 2d ii9 (1942) indicates that there is
some authority contra. Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, x7 P. 2d 626
(1932); Stearns v. Quincy Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 124 Mass. 6i (1878).
9Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, 17 P. 2d 626 (1932); Langford v.
Fanning, 7 S.W. 2d 726 (Mo. App. 1928).
xo Since the recording statutes serve as constructive notice, it is conceivable that in a
mortgage case a court might say that where a covenant to insure is a part of the mortgage,
the insurer has been put on notice and his insuring will be deemed an insurance of both inter-
ests "as the interests may appear." See note 27 infra.
"E.g., In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 At. 86 (i936); Bell v. Barefield, 219 Ala.
319, 122 So. 318 (1929). For the collected cases see Life Tenant-Insurance-Remainderman,
X26 A.L.R. 336, 337 (x940).
12 A fiduciary relationship exists when a provision in the instrument creating the estate
imposes a duty to insure. See cases cited in 31 C.J.S., Estates § 46, at 59 (1942). i Rest.,
Property § 123, subsec. 2 (i936).
'3 E.g., Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Railey, 256 Ky. 838, 77 S.W. 2d 420 (1934); Blanchard v.
Kingston, 222 Mich. 63x, 193 N.W. 241 (1923); Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, i85
S.W. 547 (i936); Spalding v. Miller, 103 Ky. 405, 45 S.W. 462 (1898). For the collected cases
see Life Tenant-Insurance--Remainderman, 126 A.L.R. 336, 337 (940).
This does not mean that one cannot insure for the benefit of the other; but if such insurance
is to be effected it must have been the intent of the insuring party to do so. Welsh v. London
Assur. Corp., 1si Pa. 607, 25 Ad. 142 (1892); In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 AUt. 86
(936).
'4 E.g., Bell v. Barefield, 219 Ala. 319, 122 So. 318 (1929); Convis v. Citizens' Mutual Fire
Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 66, 86 N.W. 994 (i9oi); Harrison v. Pepper, i66 Mass. 288, 44 N.E.
222 (x896); Western Assur. Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 6o6, 7 So. 379 (1889) (recovery allowed on
basis of estoppel because the insurer knew of the partial interest and still insured up to the
full value of the property.)
It is clear that this measure of indemnity is different from the usual measure of indemnity.
However, it has been strongly argued that the test of market value is neither the only test
zT951] COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
up to the value of the life interest,s while others have said that the insurer may
insist on limiting recovery to the value of the life interest even where the pre-
mium has been based on the value of the fee.' 6 These courts, however, refuse to
hold that a life tenant's over-insuring is sufficient to give the remainderman a
right to a part of the proceeds. 7 Other courts, feeling that the insurer has re-
ceived a windfall in that the premium has been calculated on the full value of
the property, have held that the life tenant will be deemed to have been acting
as a trustee for the remainderman and will be required to use the proceeds for
rebuilding or to pay a proportionate part thereof to the remainderman.'8
nor the proper one in this case. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 112 (1935).
The test suggested is "the peculiar value of property to the owner, so long as such value does
not exceed the cost of replacement." The feeling underlying this suggestion is that "the
life tenant cannot replace the building with a sum of money that represents merely the saleable
value of ... [that] interest," and that the life tenant in a sense has a right to the full value
since he has the full use of the full value for life. The feeling may be commendable but the
rules of law require not that the value of something to someone be found (it may be inesti-
mable), but that the objective present value of the interest be determined. The loss sustained
is not the full value of the property inasmuch as the life tenant has never had thefull value,
which is the present value of the life interest and remainder together. One comment suggests, in
speaking of similar breakdowns of the notion of indemnity, that "the public policy behind the
doctrine of strict indemnity is not so much based upon indemnity as such; rather, indemnity
is regarded as a rule of thumb limiting wagering contracts, and concomitantly, fraudulent
fires." Insurance of Mortgaged Property, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 347, 356 (1939). But such a
breakdown of indemnity could itself encourage fraudulent fires since the market value of the
life estate is almost always less than the full value of the property!
The existence of a value policy statute would in many instances be nugatory of strict in-
demnity. Michigan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Magee, 6 CCH Fire & Casualty Cases 817 (Mo.
App., 1949). Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 117 (1935)-
XS Doyle v. Ins. Co., 181 Mass. 139, 63 N.E. 394 (1902); Beekman v. Fulton County Farm-
er's Ins. Ass'n, 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N.Y.S. iio (igoi); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Yates, io Ky.
L. Rep. 984 (x889). See Blanchard v. Kingston, 222 Mich. 631, 193 N.W. 241 (1923).
x6 In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 At. 86 (936). It was said in Fidelity Ins. Trust
& S.D. Co. v. Dietz, 132 Pa. 36, 18 At. io9o (i8go) that the insurers might have insisted
upon limiting recovery to the value of the life estate; but if they did not do so it was of no
concern to the remaindermen that the life tenant was to receive the full value of the building.
A public policy argument could only be made by the insurer since the remaindermen had
no greater claim to the excess than had the life tenant. The fund represented indemnity for
loss sustained and did not constitute the proceeds of the property destroyed.
It would seem that the insurers' lack of insistence on strict indemnity defeats the purpose
of their insistence that they not be made to bear an increase of moral hazard. This would be par-
ticularly true if, as suggested by Professor Patterson, moral hazard "not only embraces the
personal qualities or habits of the insured, but also the external factors (see note 14 supra)
which tend to cause him to burn his property." Patterson, Transfer of Insured Property in
German and in American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 691, 702 (1929).
X7 E.g., In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 Atl. 86 (i936) and cases cited therein. It
might be argued that the fact that the insurer had an option to rebuild is sufficient to raise
an equity for the remainderman in the cash settlement that followed the insurer's election not
to rebuild, since the exercise of the option would have given the remainderman the use of the
building upon the death of the life tenant. But this argument overlooks the fact that it is an
insurer's option.
18 Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487, 126 S.E. 258 (1925); Green v. Green, 5o S.C. 514, 27 S.E.
952 (1897). In Clybum v. Reynolds, 3i S.C. 91, 9 S.E. 973 (1889) itwas stated that as a matter
of public policy there is always a fiduciary duty between the life tenant and remainderman.
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The majority of American courts in the vendor-purchaser cases have rejected
Rayner v. Preston, but on a theory which is inconsistent with traditional notions
of fire insurance contracts.' 9 They hold that in equity the proceeds of the ven-
dor's policy inure to the benefit of the purchaser. The courts have generally used
a constructive trust to accomplish the desired result. The insured is allowed to
collect the insurance money notwithstanding the fact that the purchaser is
obligated to make full payment; but he is deemed to hold the proceeds as trus-
tee for the purchaser.20 The result has been rationalized by the equity rule which
describes the purchaser under an executory contract as the equitable owner of
the property. A purchaser has even been permitted to institute a suit against
the vendor's insurer to compel that insurer to pay the proceeds to the insured
'9 Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A. 2d 85 (1949); Russell v.
Elliott, 45 S.D. 184, i86 N.W. 823 (1922); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 3o9, 186 N.W. 74
(1921); Millville Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Weatherby, 82 N.J. Eq. 455, 88 At. 847
(19r3); Mattingly v. Springfield Ins. Co., 120 Ky. 768, 83 S.W. 577 (i9o4); Skinner & Sons
Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 At. 85 (igoo); Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Ad. 765
(1895); Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876). Contra: Zenor v. Hayes, 228 In. 626, 8i N.E.
ii44 (1907); Marion v. Wolcott, 68 N.J. Eq. 20, 59 At. 242 (I9o4); King v. Preston, ii La.
Ann. 95 (1856); Wilson v. Hill, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 66 (1841); Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, r6
Wend. (N.Y.) 385 (z836). See Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630
(1925).
In England, Rayner v. Preston was followed in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Spooner, [io5] 2 K.B.
753; West of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1897] 1 Q.B. 226; but was finally rejected by
a Parliamentary statute 15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 47 (1925) which reads as follows: "Any money be-
coming payable after the date of any contract for the sale of property under any policy of
assurance in respect to any damage to or destruction of property included in such contract
shall, on completion of such contract, be held a receivable by the vendor on behalf of the
purchaser and paid by the vendor to the purchaser on completion of the sale or as soon there-
after as the same shall be received by the vendor." Compare § 69(i) of the German Private
Insurance Law, quoted in Patterson, The Transfer of Insured Property in German and in
American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 691, 693 (1929): "Where property insured has been trans-
ferred, all rights and liabilities arising out of the contract of insurance subsequent to the trans-
fer pass from the person effecting the insurance and are vested in, and incumbent on, the trans-
feree." Professor Patterson then says, "The present law effectuates [a temporary] automatic
transfer of the insurance contract simultaneously with the transfer of the property. No ex-
plicit assignment or agreement is necessary, either as between the transferor and the trans-
feree, or as between either of these and the insurer."
no This would not be so in a jurisdiction where the risk of loss is placed upon the vendor.
Where this is the case, the vendor is allowed to retain the proceeds. Brownell v. Board of
Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925); Phinizy v. Guernsey, iii Ga. 346,36 S.E. 796
(igoo); Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 172, at 662 (2d ed., 1930). The rule of law
placing the risk of loss upon the purchaser has been violently criticized. Anderson v. Yaworski,
120 Conn. 390, 18i At. 205 (1935) (the destruction of the house was a substantial failure of
consideration and discharged the purchaser); 4 Williston, Contracts § 940 (rev. ed., i937);
Langdell, Brief on Equity Jurisdiction 58-65 (2d ed., 1926); Griffin, Risk of Loss In Executory
Land Contracts, 4 Notre Dame Lawyer 5o6 (1929); Stone, Equitable Conversion By Con-
tract, 13 Col. L. Rev. 368, 385-87 (i913). The existence of and hardship created by the opera-
tion of the rule probably has been one of the strongest inducements to the courts to rule
contrary to Rayner v. Preston. What of the notion of splitting the loss? See Loss Splitting in
Contract Litigation, i8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1950).
In many instances the purchaser will be credited with a reduction in price equivalent to the
amount of the insurance proceeds. Transfer of Insured Property, 24 Tulane L. Rev. 378, 381
(1950).
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who would then, under the trust rationale, hold them for the purchaser.2 The
result is contrary to the logical application of the notions of a fire insurance
contract as a personal contract of indemnity. The interest insured is only that
of the vendor. 2 Unlike the life tenant-remainderman case there is nothing here
from which it can be said that the vendor was acting for the purchaser in taking
out the insurance.23
In situations other than the vendor-purchaser case, several other devices
have been used or suggested for use in permitting recovery by persons not par-
ties to the insurance contract and not within the contemplation of the insurer
at the time the contract was executed. A Texas court allowed recovery by an
owner on the theory that the named insured acted as agent for an undisclosed
principal. 24 Of course the facts may not warrant a finding of agency; and even
if a court has been able to establish an agency, the undisclosed principal rule
21 Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A. 2d 85 (i949). Cf.
Swearingen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 S.C. 355, 34 S.E. 449 (i899) (mortgage case). Com-
pare the procedure employed in the Dubin case with the discussion of the equitable lien in the
text at notes 9 and io supra.
The financial outcome of the Dubin case is interesting to note. The plaintiff purchaser
entered into an agreement to buy property for $25,ooo, but before the contract was completed
the property was damaged by fire. The plaintiff in the meantime had insured his interest for
$25,ooo, and the vendor had added $ioooo to the already outstanding $26,500 worth of in-
surance he held. The property, valued at $6oooo, was damaged by the fire to the extent of
$49,353- Subsequently, the vendee paid the balance of the purchase price and received and
recorded a deed from the vendor. A conference between the insurers resulted in the amount of
the loss being apportioned and two of the insurers sent drafts to the vendor, who returned
them stating that he had received the full purchase price of the property. The vendee claimed
it Was entitled to the proceeds of these policies and sued the insurance companies and the
vendor, claiming that the insurance companies be directed to pay the amounts due under the
policy to the vendor's executor who in turn be directed to pay over such proceeds to the
vendee. On appeal the court upheld the granting of the prayer for $49,353, the amount of the
fire damage. The plaintiff not only did not lose anything because of the fire, but he received
the benefit of his bargain with the vendor.
- The difference between the vendor-purchaser and life tenant-remainderman cases is that
the insurer in the first case must pay the vendee even though there is no actual loss by the
insured; whereas in the life tenant case the insurer is paying more than the actual loss of
the insured.
23 There is in no sense an over-insuring. At the time the vendor's policies were effected he
had an interest up to the full value of the property, unlike the life tenant. It is only at the time
the owner sells and receives a part payment that his interest is reduced, and continued pay-
ment of the old premium might be said to be over-insuring. The essential difference is, however,
that in the life tenant-remainderman case the insurer could have known of the insured's limited
interest by inquiring as to the extent of that interest before accepting the premium on the
whole property; but in the vendor-purchaser case he would be forced to inquire continually as
to whether the owner had sold his property. The latter would be an impossible burden on the
insurer. The insurer might avoid that difficulty, however, if he includes in the contract a
clause requiring that the insured notify the insurer immediately at the time of a change in the
insured's interest. If on the other hand the vendor requests a reduction in future premiums on
the basis of his decreased interest the result might be otherwise. Cf. note 56 infra. See also note
37 infra.
24 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Britt, 254 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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itself is not applicable in direct contradiction of the policy provisions's or if the
contract involves elements of personal trust and confidence as does the fire in-
surance contract.2 6 A Washington court has even gone so far as to reform an in-
surance contract to allow recovery by a third party, although there was no fa-
miliar basis for reformation.27 At most, use of the device involved a dubious
construction of the facts to effect an "equitable" solution.
Again, the use of the real party in interest statutes to permit a third party to
sue an insurance company directly without some other basis would be conver-
sion of a procedural device to a statutory creation of an otherwise nonexisting
substantive right.21 The real party in interest must be one "who can discharge
the duties created"'29 and is not necessarily the person who may ultimately be
entitled to the proceeds. In the case of insurance the only party who can dis-
charge the duties is the insured. The cases permitting action by a real party in
interest are all based on an "as the interests may appear" or similar clause and
thus have applied the statutes properly.30
25 If it is "shown... from the terms of the agreement... that the contract was exclusively
with the agent personally, the principal does not become a party thereto... ." 3 C.J.S.,
Agency § 276 (1936). Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Shadid, 68 S.W. 2d 1oo (Tex. Com. App.,
1934) holds this to be the effect of a "sole and unconditional ownership" clause. The policy
under consideration in Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Britt, 254 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923) had
such a clause but the court nevertheless allowed recovery. The court in the Shadid case tried
to distinguish the Britt holding by saying that there the unconditional ownership clause had
been waived. The opinion in the Britt case, however, gives no indication of such a waiver.
26 As long as the contract remains executory the undisclosed principal cannot enforce it
against the will of the other party. Birmingham Matinee Club v. McCarty, 152 Ala. 571,
44 So. 642 (1907); King v. Batterson, 13 R.I. 117 (i88o); Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass.
28 (1877); 2 Am. Jur., Agency § 412 (1936).
27 Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634 (i918). A made
a conditional sale of certain pool tables to B with the stipulation that B insure for the benefit
of A. B assigned his interest but remained in possession as agent for the buyer and did insure
but not in the original vendor's name. The original vendor, A, brought suit to enjoin payment
to B and to require payment to be made to A. It was held that the insurance agent could have
ascertained the true ownership of the property and that in such cases equity would, if neces-
sary, reform the policy so as to benefit the proper party. The decision was based on Gaskill v.
Northern Assur. Co., 73 Wash. 668, 132 Pac. 643 (1913), where the agent had actual knowledge
of the proper ownership of the property and the insurance company had intended to insure
the proper party. The latter case was one of simple mistake. The facts of the Robbins case on
the other hand indicate no mistake. The court in effect charged the insurer with knowledge of
the conditional sales contract when it actually had none.
as The real party in interest statutes have been interpreted to be procedural only, creating
no new substantive rights. 2 Williston, Contracts § 366 (rev. ed., 1936); Clark, Code Pleading
c. 3, § 25 (2d ed., 1947).
29 Kusmaul v. Stull, 356 Pa. 276, 280, 5i A. 2d 602, 604 (1947); Clark, Code Pleading c. 3,
§ 22 (1928).
30 Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F. 2d 237 (C.A. 8th, 1945) (vendor-vendee, as
the interests may appear); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 213 Ind. 44, 9 N.E. 2d 138 (1937)
(vendor-vendee, loss payable clause); Riley v. Federal Ins. Co., 6o Ga. App. 764, 5 S.E. 2d 246
(1939) (mortgagor-mortgagee, as theinterests may appear); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bleedorn,
235 Mo. App. 286, 132 S.W. 2d io66 (1939) (same); Marcy v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co.,
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Finally, courts in which persons other than the named insured would be
allowed to recover under a third party beneficiary theory must evade the re-
quirement that both the original parties to the contract intend that the third
party be a beneficiary,31 or draw dubious conclusions of fact to find such an in-
tent. A covenant to insure may evidence the covenantor's intent. In case of
breach equity will disregard his real, but subjective intent not to insure, and
will regard the actual insuring as evidence of intent to comply with the cove-
nant.3 2 But the insurer's intent is not so easily found. To find such intent im-
plied as a matter of law is but another device designed to effect a particular
result.
In the case of fire insurance policies which contain "as the interests may ap-
pear" or similar clauses3 it is neither illogical nor devious to hold that a pur-
chaser may maintain an action upon the vendor's policy directly against the
insurer.34 The insurer has explicitly stated his intention to assume the specific
risks involved, knowing that this would, in the end, involve liability to persons
not known to the insurer at the time of the contract. The insurer has made a
promise to insure the property 3s and pay the proceeds to all who may show an
interest within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was exe-
cuted36
54 Minn. 2, 55 N.W. 1130 (1893) (same); Kelner v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 128 Wis. 233,
io6 N.W. io6o (i9o6) (bailor-bailee, as the interests may appear). For warehouseman cases
see cases cited note 36 infra.
3' 2 Williston, Contracts § 347 (rev. ed., 1936); 4 Corbin, Contracts c. 41 (I951).
32 This is under the equitable maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to have
been done. See note 8 supra.
33 "On account of whom it may concern" came from and is primarily used in marine in-
surance policies. "In trust or on commission" is generally used in policies covering warehouse
goods.
34 Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F. 2d 237 (C.A. 8th, 1945). "It is not forbidden
by law that a policy should be so framed that the insurance shall be inseparably attached to
the property meant to be covered, so that successive owners, during the continuance of the
risks, shall become, in turn, the parties insured." Waring v. Indemnity Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.Y.
6o6, 6ii (1871).
35 Patterson speaks of this problem in terms of assignment and says, "The insurance of
mechandise. . . 'in trust or on commission' makes the insurer's consent to the transfer of
the property unnecessary and even dispenses with any formal assignment of the policy."
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 49, at 184 (1935).
36 Generally a warehouseman is answerable to the owner of goods for the proceeds of in-
surance received after loss when the policy is taken out by the former either voluntarily or
pursuant to an express or implied agreement. For the collected cases see Warehouseman-
Proceeds of Insurance, 52 A.L.R. 1409 (1928).
In the case of fire policies which cover goods held by the insured as bailee or warehouse-
man, under an "in trust or on commission" clause, it is generally held that the owner of the
property, as the real party in interest or the party for whose benefit the p6licy was taken out,
may maintain an action upon the policy directly against the insurer. For the collected cases
see Insurance Policy-Who May Sue, 61 A.L.R. 720, 721 (1929). This general rule may be
limited by the terms of the insurance policy. For example, in the case of provision for adjust-
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An arguable basis for a comparable result may be found in the cases where
one party procures insurance beyond the value of his own interest. If, for exam-
ple, a life tenant insures up to the value of the fee and the premium is based on
the full value of the property, although the insurer has not expressly stated his
intent, he might be deemed to have assumed the risk of liability to an unknown
person. It may be hard to understand why an insurance company can continue
to collect a premium based on the full value of the property and still not be
liable for payment on that basis. But the insurer has no actual knowledge that
the insured's interest is partial, and there is no justifiable basis for imputing
such knowledge to him unless a general duty to inquire as to the extent of the in-
sured's interest can be imposed upon him.37 The most that has ever been im-
posed upon an insurer is a burden to inquire about the condition of the property
or the "moral hazard" he is to assume, since the insured is only under a duty
not to conceal material facts fraudulently.38
If a duty to inquire were imposed on the insurer"9 a third party would clearly
have rights in cases of over-insuring. An exploratory inquiry4o reveals that the
discrepancy between the actual inquiries now made as to the client's legal in-
terest and any inquiries that ought to be made is not great. The agents rarely
ment with and payment to the bailee, a direct action could be maintained only if the bailee
failed to act properly. Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., x9o App. Div. 5o6, 179 N.Y.S.
867 (1920), aff'd 229 N.Y. 6r2, 129 N.E. 929 (1920).
Where a statute requires a warehouseman to insure for the benefit of his bailors, the bailor
may maintain an action, as the real party in interest, against the insurer, even though the
warehouseman was the sole named insured in a policy without any "in trust or on commission
clause," and even though the warehouseman started the fire and was himself barred from main-
taining the action. In Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bunds, x58 Kan. 662, 149 P. 2d 350 (1944), the
court said that the insurance contract was really two contracts, one with the warehouseman,
and one with the bailor. See also Gardner v. Freystown Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 350 Pa. 1,37 A.
2d 535 (1944).
37 It could be argued that since other parties who have insurable interests in insured prop-
erty probably tend to rely on the insurer's promise and since the insurer knows this, it would
not be unreasonable to require an insurance company to inquire as to the nature of the in-
sured's interest. In the case of over-insuring therefore, the insurer would be expected to dis-
cover that the insured had only a partial interest. If an insurer over-insures, the knowledge
he would have had, had he inquired, could thus be imputed to him, and he would be deemed
to have clearly manifested his intent to insure the interest of a third party. The objection to
this argument is that reasonable reliance can be found only where there is a covenant to insure,
in which case the covenantor would have an insurable interest up to the full value of the
property. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 113 (1935). There would then be no
over-insuring and the insurer's inquiry or lack of it could not possibly demonstrate his intent
to insure the interest of a third party.
38 Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 87, at 386 (i935).
39 The arguments for imposing a duty to inquire are based on the equitable notions de-
scribed in the text. See p. 124 infra. See also note 70 infra.
40 A questionnaire was prepared and distributed to a group of Chicago insurance agents
picked at random from the telephone classified directory. Forty replies were received. The
returned copies of the questionnaire are at present on file in the Law Library of the University
of Chicago.
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inquire as to whether the client is a life tenant or a remainderman. The probable
explanation is that since the law generally gives the life tenant a right to insure
and collect the proceeds up to the full value of the property, there is no need for
such inquiry. If the law were otherwise the need for inquiry would be very
definite. The fact that many agents do not inquire as to whether a client is a
conditional seller or buyer may be explained by the fact that many do not han-
dle such cases. It was found, however, that all agents do inquire as to whether
the client was a mortgagor or mortgagee and that the great majority make in-
quiries as to whether the client was a lessor or lessee, or a vendor or purchaser.
Thus the imposition of a duty to inquire and the entailing legal results may not
be too onerous.
In Spires v. Hanover Insurance Co.,4' the preservation of the principles of the
fire insurance contract were pitted against the seeming "equity" of a third
party's claim. The plaintiff landlord leased certain land and buildings, the lessee
convenanting "to keep the buildings now erected or to be erected.., insured
against loss by fire" and to keep all the leased premises in proper repair.z The
lessee procured a fire insurance policy from the defendant but in his own name.
When the buildings were destroyed by fire, the lessee settled with the insurer.
His settlement, however, gave him an amount equal to the value of the new
buildings only. The lessee refused to file a proof of loss as to the original build-
ing or to institute an action against the insurance company. The plaintiff
filed a proof of loss and instituted the present action in his own name against
the insurance company alone. The court sustained the insurance company's
demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not show any right of action
by the plaintiff against this defendant. The majority stated that the insurance
was not taken out for the plaintiff's benefit. "The policy of fire insurance is a
personal contract of indemnity against such loss as the insured may sustain;
the insurance is not of the property as such, but of the interest of the insured in
the property."43 Therefore, a lessor may not bring an action on a policy issued in
the name of the lessee even though as against the lessee the lessor might ulti-
mately be entitled to the proceeds. The minority suggested agency, third party
beneficiary or real party in interest theories as rationales for recovery.
Spires was a hard case because the facts did not warrant a finding of agency so
as to invoke the undisclosed principal rule;44 the plaintiff could not have been
4z 364 Pa. 52, 7o A. 2d 828 (i95o); noted in 36 Va. L. Rev. 548 (ig5o) and 35 Minn. L. Rev.
102 (1950).
42 These covenants as construed by the court obligated the lessee to restore the original
building at the termination of the lease if it had meanwhile been destroyed. See Patterson,
Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 113 (1935).
43 Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 56, 70 A. 2d 828, 83o (195o).
44 Since there was no "unconditional ownership" or similar clause in the policy, the applica-
tion of the undisclosed principal rule would probably have been appropriate. In addition, the
insurance contract was probably no longer executory-the premiums having been paid and
accepted and the obligation having accrued as of the time of the fire--so as to fall within an
exception to the undisclosed principal rule. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
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a real party in interest unless he had a substantive right as a third party bene-
ficiary;46 and though it is true that the lessee might have been deemed to have
insured for the benefit of the lessor,47 the facts did not show an intent on the
part of the insurer to make the lessor a beneficiary.4a An equitable action against
the lessee and the insurance company to settle any cause of action that might
exist between the lessor and the lessee and between the lessee and the insurance
company, as suggested by the majority,49 was probably not a satisfactory
remedy. The lessor in the present case might not have been able to serve process
on the lessee, or the lessee might have been judgment-proof.so Moreover, as be-
tween the lessee and the insurance company, the latter might have been able to
defend on the ground that it had already settled with the insured.s" Probably
the only avenue open to the lessor was a direct action against the insurer. How-
ever, acceptance of any of the above theories would change the entire basis of
fire insurance law from insurance of a particular party's interest to insurance of
all the interests (as they may appear) in the property.
On the whole, there is probably little demonstrable justification based on
4s There was no "as the interests may appear" clause. See text at note 3o supra. See also
note 3i supra.
46 Authorities cited note 28 supra.
47 The only discernible purpose of the covenant is to give the lessor additional protection by
binding the lessee to insure for the lessor's benefit. Under the maxim that equity regards as done
that which ought to have been done, the act of insuring has been deemed to have been in com-
pliance with the covenant even though the covenantor insured only in his own name. See
note 8 supra. The majority of the court in the instant case, however, stated that it would not
so construe the act of insuring.
48 There is not only no clause such as "as the interests may appear" but there is not even an
indication that the insurer might have been aware of the existence of the lessor or the lessee's
covenant.
Even if over-insuring were held to put an insurer on notice so as to effect insurance of a
third party's interest, the present case would not be solved since the lessee, being obligated to
replace the building, had an insurable interest in the full value of the property. Patterson,
Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 113 (1935).
49 This is the procedure used in Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68,
63 A. 2d 85 (1949). See note 21 supra.
so There are no facts available in either the opinion or the record as to these matters.
However, since the plaintiff was given three opportunities to amend his complaint (during
which time he could have also joined any necessary parties) and did not do so, the fair implica-
tion is that the lessee was judgment-proof or service couldn't be had, as suggested.
s, Robinson v. Breuminger, 152 Kan. 644, 107 P. 2d 688 (i94o). The mortgage contained a
covenant to insure but the mortgagor procured a policy in his own name. Upon destruction
of the property the insurance company was notified of the mortgagee's interest. A settlement
was made, however, with the mortgagor alone. After the mortgagor converted the money the
mortgagee brought an action against both the mortgagor and the insurance company. The
court allowed the form of action and held the insurance company liable to the mortgagee,
stating that, "whether the insurance company can be held depends upon the facts relative
to knowledge or notice to the insurer of the rights of the mortgagee." Ibid., at 65i and 692.
As indicated in note 48 supra there is no evidence in either the record or opinion of the
Spires case to show that the insurer was aware of the existence of the lessor or the lessee's
covenant.
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commercial practice, and there are certainly no sound logical bases for effecting
such a change. This becomes clear when one realizes the ease with which the
lessor in the Spires case, for example, might have procured insurance himself
and made the cost of the premium a part of the rent. If he wished to place the
burden of insuring upon the lessee, the lease could have provided that upon the
lessee's failure to insure properly, the lessor could then insure and charge pre-
miums to the lessee. Under such a provision, a careless lessor certainly has no
equities on his side!
There may, however, be an "equitable basis" for making a change in the
present law so as at least to put prospective buyers of fire insurance on notice
that third parties will not be protected unless the policy so stipulates. This
could be done by requiring insurers who wish to come under the doctrine of
Rayner v. Preston to make it clear in the policy that third parties are not in-
cluded within the coverage. Such a requirement would provide warning to the
laymen who may now wrongly conceive of fire insurance as running with the
land.s2
Probably the general dissatisfaction with the rule of Rayner v. Preston indi-
cates that a fire insurance contract really does have a different meaning for
persons who ordinarily buy insurance than it has for professional insurers. The
decisions contrary to Rayner v. Preston may in themselves give effect to a not
unreasonable lay understanding and encourage the public to entertain such an
understanding.53 It may be felt that the insurance company has assumed a risk
for which a full premium has been paid and that it should not be relieved from
paying on that basis.5 4 Someone suffers loss from the destruction of the property
insured; it may not seem a hardship or injustice to the company to require it to
pay the policySS Even the business public may assume that an executory con-
tract for the sale of insured realty carries the protection of existing insurance
s2The lay conception is postulated in Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 172, at
662 (2d ed., 1930); 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 766, 767 (I95O) noting Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 36i Pa., 68, 62 A. 2d 85 (I949); dissent in Rayner v. Preston, is Ch. Div. i, iS
(i88i) "I believe it [the fire policy] to be considered by the universal consensus of mankind, to
be a policy for the benefit of all persons interested in the property."
53 It was said in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., io Wash.
2d 303, 314, 1i6 P. 2d 539, 544 (1941) that "the insurance would stand as security for the
mortgage debt in lieu of the property destroyed"; and in Doty v. Rensselaer County Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 188 App. Div. 29, 32, 176 N.Y. Supp. 55, 57 (igir) the court said, "The insur-
ance money takes the place of the house. Whatever interest in the house the plaintiff had, a
corresponding interest attached to the insurance which is a substitute for the house." Likewise
it has been said that "[the property being destroyed, the insurance money stands in lieu
thereof." Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 3os Wash. 539, 544, 173 Pac. 634, 635
(1918). And in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 6711.43,46(1873): "the insurance money repre-
sented the property destroyed...."
54See Vanneman, Risk of Loss, Between Vendor & Purchaser, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127, 138
(1923).
55 Ibid. Compare the notion of insurance in the area of workmen's compensation where the
underlying principle is that the insurer is in a better position to distribute the cost of the risk
throughout the community, working no hardship on any one party.
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policies to the purchaserS6 Common sense often seems to substitute the insur-
ance money for the insured property, despite the general rule that the two are
not legally connected.
These conceptions as to the nature of fire insurance, however, are not in
themselves sufficient basis for making an extensive change from insurance of a
particular party's interest to insurance of all the interests in the property. It is
necessary to find that there is no justification for the personal contract notion.
Rayner v. Preston rests partly on the view that to deny an insurer complete free-
dom in chosing the insured is to burden him with an unascertainable "moral
hazard."
The results of an exploratory inquiry,57 undertaken to discover the extent to
which insurance agents investigate prospective clients indicate that this em-
phasis on the personal contract notion may no longer be warranted. s5 The sur-
vey shows that none of the replying agents thoroughly investigate a client unless
a special matter indicating that the client may be a bad risk is brought to the
attention of the agent.5 9 The specific inquiries made by each insurance firm
vary greatly, depending on such circumstances as the agent's evaluation of the
client's appearance or the location of the property to be insured. Twenty-three
per cent6 ° of the replying agents make inquiries about the client's fire record.
Ten per cent 6 indicate that they inquire into the client's habits in maintaining
56 Speaking of the automatic transfer of insurance coverage on property which is to be con-
veyed in the German law, Professor Patterson says that the "automatic transfer... probably
conforms to the transferee's habits and expectations." Patterson, op. cit. supra note ig, at
693. The German law provision is set out in note 19 supra.
There is arguably a significant difference between the case of a vendor selling land and
buildings already insured and the case of a vendor (or purchaser) insuring during the life of a
land contract. The former is much like an assignment of the existing fire policies. Since such
policies are not assignable without the insurer's assent, the automatic transfer and coverage of
both interests by the policy may be more reprehensible than such coverage in the second
case. There, it would have been possible for the insurer to inquire and discern the two existing
interests. Cf. note 23 supra. Consult Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853), where a
vendor insured the realty sold, but only partially paid for, in his own name, and paid the
premium himself. The court thought it clear that all the parties intended the insurance to
cover the vendee's interest as well as the insuring vendor's since the premium charge was
adequate for such coverage. In neither case, however, would the insurer have had actual
knowledge of the other interest. See note 37 supra.
57 See note 4o supra.
58 An insurance survey consisting of a careful listing of insurance needs, noting existing
insurance, and recommending needed adjustments or additional insurance, is probably what
should be undertaken by each agent in order to assure the client the best possible coverage. For
a detailed discussion of the steps in such a survey see Hedges, Improving Property and Casu-
alty Insurance Coverage, i5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 353, 371 (1950)-
59 In some instances no inquiry is made at all unless such circumstances are present.
60 Forty per cent would be the figure if the computation had been made on the basis of the
number of replies indicating that inquiries as to "moral hazard" are made.
61 Eighteen per cent would be the figure if based on the alternative method indicated in
note 6o supra.
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and caring for the property, and twenty per cent 6 inquire as to whether the cli-
ent has, in the past, received any cancellations of fire policies or rejections of his
application for such policies.13 On the other hand, forty-five per cent 4 make no
inquiries at all about the "moral hazard" to be borne by the insurer.6 s Although
these results are in no way conclusive," they seem to indicate that a great deal
of the insurer's protection has been destroyed by the lack of extensive inquiry
by the insurance agent. 67 It may not, therefore, be unreasonable to effect a basic
change in the law of fire insurance; 6 but it would be sounder to postpone such
action until further justification is found in more extensive studies of business
practice in this field.
The present alternative is to use some means to guard against common lay
misconceptions as to the nature of fire insurance. When it comes to understand-
ing the myriad of technical and often ambiguous clauses of a fire insurance con-
tract, the lay public is in an unequal "bargaining" position compared to the in-
surer, the expert. The layman is caught in something in the nature of a "fine
print trap. ' 69 The insurer is in a better position to draft an instrument to serve
62 Thirty-six per cent would be the figure if based on the alternative method indicated in
note 6o supra.
63 Another object of inquiry is the total amount of insurance carried.
64 This percentage too has been calculated on the basis of the total number of replies.
6s Premiums seem to be based on the amount of coverage and the condition of the property.
The survey indicated that the coverage of more than one interest in the property by a clause
such as "as the interests may appear" can be had without any increased premium.66 The results are inconclusive for at least two reasons: (i) the interpretation and presenta-
tion of the results is necessarily subjective; (2) the sample is much too small. The larger under-
taking necessary in order to produce conclusive results would require time and resources not
available to the average student or faculty member. An organization of the magnitude of the
American Law Institute would be necessary.
A larger undertaking might attempt a classification of kinds of insurance agents, e.g., (i)
the single agent with no office, (2) the large firm, (a) in a metropolitan area, (b) in a more
rural area, (3) the specialist, (a) handling realty insurance only, (i) business buildings,
(ii) homes, etc. The possible classifications are almost limitless but such breakdowns may
have significant results.
67 It must be recognized that the insurer's own checking in the home office has not been
mentioned. This may be an important element and is certainly worth a separate survey. For
some indication, however, that there is little such checking done, and that most of that
presently done is valueless, see Patterson, Transfer of Insured Property in German and in
American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 691, 706-7 (1929).
68 The personal contract notion depends, in part, on the assumption that a significant num-
ber of fires are fraudulent fires. It has been suggested that "the common carelessness of the
American people is the risk assumed by the insurers doing business in the United States."
Patterson, op. cit. supra note i9, at 705, 7o6. How is this risk increased by a change in owner-
ship? If a fire be proved fraudulent, there is no problem. As for those which cannot be proved
Professor Patterson says "the number of persons who have fraudulent fires must be only a
fractional percentage of the total number of persons insured against fire, and the crucial
question is whether the interests and convenience of honest insured persons should be sacri-
ficed in order to defeat recovery by a small proportion of dishonest persons who succeed in
concealing their crimes." Ibid., at 705.
69 The lay position today in understanding the words of the fire insurance contract may be
comparable to the warranty dilemma which flowered little over a century and a half ago.
Warranties were then construed so that even an immaterial breach voided the policy. The
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the needs and understanding of the client and to protect himself by appropriate
clauses drawn in clear, readable language.7° The insurer may of course further
protect himself by properly calculating the premium for the risk he assumes.
Placing this burden upon the insurer would probably not be a hardship; there
would seem to be enough law protecting third parties to put him on notice. 7'
Such a change would be analogous to a development which has taken place
in the surety bond cases. The words of the contract of the compensated surety
are now interpreted liberally in the interest of the third party laborer and ma-
terialman rather than strictly in favor of the surety.72 To a lesser degree, a simi-
lar development has taken place in the liability insurance cases where courts
have held73 that the contract should be liberally construed for the protection
of third parties unless the language of the contract is clearly to the contrary.
Many statutes go even further and require that all liability insurance be carried
for the benefit of third parties.74 Courts generally deny rights to third parties
unless the promisor and promisee of a fire insurance contract intended to create
such rights and unless the language of the contract specifically and clearly
established them. Instead, the courts could take the position that the insurance
contract should be construed liberally for the benefit of third parties unless the
words of the policy are clearly and unambiguously to the contrarys and are set
out in such fashion that they are not physically obscured.
inequity was perceived by the courts and, through judicial decision, substantial compliance
with the warranties became sufficient so long as the deviation was such that it did not or
probably would not have affected the issuance of the policy. See Patterson, Essentials of In-
surance Law § 61 (1935).
70 A distinction shouldbe recognized between the duty to draft an instrument clearly and the
dutyto inquire, for instance, as to the extent of the client's interest in theproperty orhis need of
an "as the interests may appear" clause. The duty to inquire, however, would be imposed for
the same equitable reasons that the duty to draft clearly is imposed. See p. 124 supra. See
note 39 supra.
It seems that anyone may have an "as the interests may appear" clause upon request and
without any additional charge, yet many agents do not offer the suggestion that such a clause
be included in the policy. This seems a pity for surely such a suggestion in the appropriate
case would be an even more "constructive" aspect of the imposition of a duty to draft clearly.
71' Particularly in the vendor-purchaser cases.
724 Corbin, Contracts § 8oo, at 176 (1951). For a thorough analysis of the problem see
Campbell, The Protection of Laborers and Materialmen Under Construction Bonds, 3 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 201 (1935).
73 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F. 2d 75 (1935); Ndw Amsterdam Casualty Co.
v. Jones, 135 F. 2d ii, 196 (1943); 4 Corbin, Contracts § 807 (i95i); Vance, Handbook of the
Law of Insurance § 178, at 684 (2d ed., 193o).
74 In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191, i96 (i943), the court's public
policy decision was in some measure based on such a statute. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 807 (1951);
Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 178, at 686 (2d ed., 1930).
75 Professor Schultz in The Special Nature of The Insurance Contract: A Few Suggestions
for Further Study, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 376, 378 (195o) says that to some extent such is
the law, in spite of lip service to other principles, and that, to the extent such is not the law,
it should be.
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This change would effect an insurance of all the interests in the property in
the case of ambiguity; though practically it would mean only that liability to
third parties must be denied in clear language. Insurance companies would be in
the same relative position they are in now. Presently justifiable lay expectations
would be checked and the broader change to insurance of all the interests in the
property would be properly postponed until it can be fully justified on the basis
of more extensive studies into the practical context in which these rules of fire
insurance law operate.
TEE NONCUMULATIVE CLAUSE AND RENEWED FIDELITY
BONDS-PIG IN A POKE?
In Columbia Hospitalfor Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,r defendant
surety company issued a fidelity bond indemnifying the plaintiff against defal-
cations by certain named employees, with a maximum indemnity of $5,ooo in
the case of plaintiff's bookkeeper. Renewal was effected by subsequent issu-
ance of a Blanket Position Bond' affording slightly broader coverage. The sec-
ond bond had no definite date of termination, but was renewable on payment of
annual premiums, subject to the proviso that the payment of such premiums
"shall not render the amount of this bond cumulative from year to year."
Four years after the original bond was issued, a rider was attached, "extending
the term for three years from the renewal date" and respectively substituting
the terms "periods," "premium period" and "agreed premiums" for the words
"years," "premium year" and "annual premiums" wherever they occurred in
the Blanket Position Bond. Three years later, plaintiff discovered that its book-
keeper had embezzled in excess of $4o,ooo over a four year period, $5,498.32
during the year before the rider went into effect, and $3,975.47, $13,28i.45 and
$17,555.9 o respectively during the three years covered by the bond and rider.
The insured accordingly filed a claim for $18,975.47 on the theory that the fidel-
ity company's liability was $5,000 for each year of coverage. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia affirmed the grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, limiting recovery to $5,000.
No authoritative survey has ever been conducted to determine what was an
important question in the principal case, what employers really think they
x i88 F. 2d 654 (App. D.C., 195).
2 Fidelity bonds can be made out to cover either specifically named employees, or the occu-
pants of designated positions for the time being. The companies have fashioned many different
kinds of bonds, containing various combinations of these two basic features. Among the most
widely used are the Name Schedule or Fidelity Schedule bonds, covering named employees,
with or without indications of position; Position Schedules, bonding the positions listed re-
gardless of which employees occupy them or how often the personnel shifts; and Blanket
Position Bonds, covering all employees of the insured employer for the same amount, regard-
less of position or name. Riegel and Miller, Insurance Principles and Practices 694, 698-703
(3d. ed., 1947).
[Vol. 19
